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DEPAUL v COMMONWEALTH: A LOOK AT POLITICAL
CONTRIBUTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE HORSE-RACING
INDUSTRY
STEPHANIE M. WURDOCK*
I. INTRODUCTION
In July of 2004, Pennsylvania enacted the Pennsylvania Race Horse
Development and Gaming Act ("Gaming Act" or "Act").' The Act
functioned as a vessel through which the state legislature could introduce
legalized slot machine gaming in Pennsylvania and brought with it hopes of
increased state revenue and additional forms of tax relief.2 The Act was
designed to maintain the integrity of the gaming industry and Vrotect the
public through strict regulation and policing of gaming activities. Included
within the Gaming Act are various tools for accomplishing the legislature's
goals, one of which is Section 1513, entitled "Political Influence."" Section
1513 identifies a class of individuals within the gaming industry and
prohibits its members from making certain political contributions.s
Specifically, this section bans certain individuals from contributing
financially to local political party committees, groups organized in support
of local candidates, or the campaigns of candidates running for local public
office.
In 2008, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed and decided
DePaul v. Commonwealth, in which the Petitioner challenged the
constitutionality of this political ban as being an "overly broad and
unlawfully discriminatory infringement of the rights to free expression and
association." 7 These rights are guaranteed by Article I, Sections 7, 20, and
26 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.'
* Articles Editor, KENTUCKY JOURNAL OF EQUINE, AGRICULTURAL, AND NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW, 2010-2011; B.A. in Marketing 2008, summa cum laude, University of Kentucky; J.D.
expected May 2011, University of Kentucky College of Law.
' Pennsylvania Race Horse Development and Gaming Act, 4 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1101-1904
(2006) (amended 2010).
Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board, http://www.pgcb.state.pa.us (follow "Gaming"
hyperlink; then follow "Benefits for Pennsylvanians" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 5, 2010).
4 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1102 (2004).
4 Id. at § 1513, declared unconstitutional by DePaul v. Commonwealth, 969 A.2d 536 (Pa.
2009).
Id. at § 1513(a).
6 Id.
DePaul, 969 A.2d at 538.
'Id.
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The Petitioner in DePaul was a local businessman who held a
9.54% controlling interest in Philadelphia Entertainment and Development
Partners ("PEDP"), a company which owned a local casino.9 According to
definitions provided in the Gaming Act, that ownership interest qualified
Petitioner as a "principal" and subjected him to the political ban.'o Wholly
unaware of Section 1513's prohibitions, he made twenty-one political
contributions in 2006, a number of which fell within the Section 1513
restrictions." Upon realizing his error, Petitioner requested a total refund
of his contributions and entered into a consent decree with the Pennsylvania
Gaming Control Board ("Control Board"). 12
The resulting court opinion in DePaul addressed the conflict
between the Gaming Act's primary objective, the protection of public
confidence, and that of the judiciary, the protection of constitutional rights.
By examining the decision in DePaul, this Comment analyzes how courts
might strike a balance between the competing interests of the public at-
large and those of individuals affiliated with racing and gaming facilities.
In Section II, this Comment discusses the legal background of
DePaul. Next, Section III presents Petitioner's constitutional claims.
Section IV examines the court's survey of similar judicial decisions, while
Section V discusses and interprets the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's
holding. Finally, Section VI considers the implications of that decision for
the gaming industry.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Statutory Background
DePaul evaluated the constitutionality of the Gaming Act's Section
1513 political ban on two grounds. First, the court assessed the ban's
restriction of the right of free speech and association which are guaranteed
by Article I, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 3  Second, it
considered whether the ban violated Article I, Section 26 of the state
constitution which restricts unlawful or baseless discrimination against any
person's civil rights.' 4
9 Id.
1o See 4 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1103 (2006) (amended 2010).
"DePaul, 969 A.2d at 539.
12 Id. at 539-40.
nId. at 540.
4 Id. at 541.
170 [Vol. 3 No. 1
POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND HORSE RACING
1. Gaming Act Provisions
The Gaming Act had a number of goals which included furthering
the tourism market, promoting and assisting the horse racing industry, and
generating new revenue for the state of Pennsylvania."s One additional,
relevant purpose was to maintain and enhance public trust in local elected
officials in the advent of slot machine gambling.' 6  Section 1102
specifically articulated the Pennsylvania legislature's desire to maintain the
integrity of gaming regulations in order to prevent actual corruption or the
appearance of corruption that may result from campaign contributions, as
well as "ensure bipartisan administration of [the Act]; and avoid actions
that may erode public confidence in the system of representative
government."' 7
The state legislature set out to achieve this goal by writing a
number of regulatory provisions into the Act. Section 1103 sets the
groundwork by defining pertinent terminology, including the term
"principal." 18 The Act defines a "principal" as a person having an
ownership interest in restricted gaming activity.' 9 This definition includes
officers, directors, and any other person who owns a beneficial interest or
has a controlling interest in a gaming applicant or licensee.2 0 For the
purposes of the Act, an "applicant" is defined as a person who requests
permission to engage in a gaming activity that is restricted therein, for
example, installing slot machines.21
Section 1513 then imposed upon those individuals a restriction on
political contributions. Specifically, the Act prohibited principals of slot
machine licensees, licensed manufacturers, licensed suppliers, and licensed
racing entities from making political contributions to local candidates for
public office or to local political parties.2 2 Section 1513 also went so far as
to ban attendance at political functions such as dinners, meetings, and
fundraising events that required the purchase of a ticket.23
To enforce the political ban and other regulations, the Gaming Act
required that a Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board ("Control Board") be
established and, within that board, a Bureau of Investigations and
Enforcement ("Bureau") be created.2 4 The Control Board's website, which
" 4 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1102 (3), (4), (6) (2004) (amended 2010).
'6 Id. at § 1102 (11).
7 Id. at § 1102 (11).
8 Id. at § 1103.
19 Id.
20 id
21 4 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1103 (2006) (amended 2010).
2 Id at § 1513(a).
23 Id. at § 1513(d).
1 Id. at §§ 1201(a), 1517(a).
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it is required to create and maintain by statute,25 states that its mission is to
"protect the interest of the public by ensuring the integrity of legalized
gaming through the strict enforcement of the law and regulations....26 The
Bureau, although existing entirely within the Control Board, acts
independently in matters relating to the political ban.2 As the independent
body for enforcing those ban provisions, it is empowered investigate and
review all permit or license applicants and generally monitor all gaming
28
operations.
2. Pennsylvania Constitutional Provisions
The constitutional challenge in DePaul derived from freedoms
guaranteed by the Pennsylvania Constitution. Article I, Section 7 of the
state constitution provides that "the free communication of thoughts and
opinions is one of the invaluable rights of man, and every citizen may freely
speak, write and print out on the subject...." 29 This, in conjunction with the
right of petition granted by Article I, Section 20, provides generous
protection for freedom of speech and association.30 Additionally, Article I,
Section 26 establishes that neither the state nor its agencies may
discriminate against an individual's exercise of his civil rights in an
unlawful or baseless manner.31  These constitutional guarantees, although
slightly broader in reality, are considered equal to the U.S. Constitution's
First Amendment Right of Free Speech for the purposes of this Comment.
B. Political Corruption
Many of the Gaming Act provisions, Section 1513 in particular, are
premised upon the belief that racing and gaming industry leaders use wealth
and influence to sway local politicians to act in the industry's best interests.
Society fears that this enables casinos and other gaming facilities to unfairly
influence the entire political process. 32  This is evidenced by a "long-
standing and strong sensitivity to the evils traditionally associated with ...
gambling when it is unregulated" in America.33 Gambling regulations do
little to quiet these fears; for even when regulatory processes are put into
2s I. at §1513 (a.2) (1).
26 Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board, Mission Statement, http://www.pgcb.state.pa.us
(follow "About PCGB" hyperlink; then follow "Vision Statement / Mission Statement" hyperlink) (last
visited Oct. 5, 2010).
27 4 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1517 (a) (2006) (amended 2010).
28 Id. at § 1517 (a)-(a.1).29 PA. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
'o See PA. CONST. art. I, §§ 7, 20.
' DePaul, 969 A.2d at 541; PA. CONST. art. 1, § 26.
3 DePaul, 969 A.2d at 545 (citing Petition of Soto, 565 A.2d 1088, 1093-1094 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1989)).
" DePaul, 969 A.2d at 545.
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place, their integrity is often called into question.34 Arguably, a regulation
process that is laxly monitored and enforced, while created with noble
intentions, leads to erosion of confidence in the integrity of a state's
representative government.
Furthermore, a significant percentage of Americans consider
gambling to be an activity that is "rife with evil" and mischievous in terms
of the public welfare and morality.35 These some people do not even
believe that gambling should be legal, much less loosely regulated.
Therefore, it would be irresponsible to ignore the possibility that popular
public disapproval of gambling may in fact outweigh the activity's
economic benefits for the state, whatever its regulations or restrictions.
III. DEPAULS'S CLAIMS
Petitioner's main claim in DePaul was that the Gaming Act's
political ban was "overly broad and unlawfully discriminatory" so as to
violate Petitioner's constitutional rights of political expression and
association. Petitioner asserted that the Act affected his constitutional
rights and therefore required strict scrutiny review, the highest level of
judicial scrutiny.37 Strict scrutiny requires a showing that the contested
statute serves a compelling government interest and is "narrowly tailored"
to achieve that interest.38 Petitioner argued that the ban in Section 1513
could not survive such review because it was not narrowly-tailored and
served a purpose other than that articulated by the legislature.
The legislature articulated the apparent purpose of the Act in
Section 1102, entitled "Legislative Intent," stating that the political ban was
enacted to prevent corruption of the type that normally results when
members of any major industry makes large campaign contributions.4 0 In
light of that provision, however, a ban of all political contributions,
regardless of size, would appear to be overly-inclusive. Another
questionable characteristic of the ban is that it failed to require a connection
between the licensed gaming industry and the "recipient political
candidate."4' Finally, the legislature also failed to indicate any "scintilla of
evidence" that would connect licensed gaming and political contributions to
political corruption within the state of Pennsylvania.4 2
3 See Id.; 4 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1102(11) (2004) (amended 2010).
3s DePaul, 969 A.2d at 551 (quoting Soto, 565 A.2d at 1093-94 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1989)).
36 DePaul, 969 A.2d at 538.
" Id. at 552.
n Id. at 540.
3 Id. at 543.
4 4 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1102 (11) (2004) (amended 2010).
41 DePaul, 969 A.2d at 543.
42 Id. at 540-41.
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IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
To begin its analysis, the DePaul court imposed a heavy burden for
overturning the Section 1513 ban, adopting the view that all doubts as to the
constitutionality of the statute were to be resolved in favor of the legislative
enactment.43 Thus, it required that the ban be construed, when possible, to
preserve its constitutionality."
A. Application ofStrict Scrutiny
The DePaul court first determined the applicable standard of
review. Using its previous decisions as guidance, the court found the
constitutional freedoms of speech and association were implicated by the
freedom of political expression limited by Section 1513.45 The court then
declared strict scrutiny the appropriate level of review where freedom of
expression is at issue.4 6 Although Section 1513 implicated this freedom,
the court also stated that the quantity of expression does not increase
substantially in correlation with the quantity of contribution.47 It follows
that political contribution bans, irrespective of size, restrict political
expression and are therefore subject to strict scrutiny review. As a result,
the constitutional question for the court became whether the Section 1513
ban was narrowly tailored to accomplish the compelling state interest of
preventing the "actual or appearance of corruption" resulting from
48
campaign contributions by principles in a large and influential industries.
B. The Court's Survey of Other Jurisdictions
With strict scrutiny established as the appropriate measure of
review, the court next looked to jurisdictions that had decided similar
constitutional questions.4 9 At the time of that survey, nineteen states had
legalized either "racinos"50 or some other form of gambling.'
Among those nineteen states, the legislative approaches to political
bans in the gaming industry were anything but uniform. 52 Five states had
enacted statutes imposing blanket bans to political contributions;53 however,
4 Id. at 545-46 (citing Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion Fund, Inc. v.
Commonwealth, 877 A.2d 383, 393 (Pa. 2005)).
4 DePaul, 969 A.2d at 546 (quoting In re William L., 383 A.2d 1228, 1231 (Pa. 1978)).
45 DePaul, 969 A.2d at 548.
46Id.
47 Id. at 547 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.1, 20-21 (1976)).
4 DePaul, 969 A.2d at 552.
49 Id. at 544.
50 Id. at 548 (defining a "racino" as a combined racetrack and casino).
s' Id.
52 Id. at 551.
" Id. at 543.
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only two states' courts, New Jersey and Louisiana, upheld these blanket
bans in the face of a First Amendment challenge.-4 Notably, only one of
those bans would apply to an individual in Petitioner's particular ownership
position." The remaining fourteen states imposed either very specific
restrictions or no restrictions at all. 6
The courts upholding political bans required their respective
legislatures to demonstrate both a sufficiently important state interest and a
closely tailored means of protecting that interest. Specifically, the political
ban could not be an "unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms.""
For example, bans survived judicial review when they applied solely to
casino "key employees," defined as "persons in a supervisory capacity or
empowered to make discretionary decisions which regulate casino
operations."" This select prohibition was found to be narrowly tailored to
protect governmental processes from unlawful influence. 59 Therefore, these
types of limited bans stand a better chance of withstanding constitutional
review.
Courts ruling in favor of blanket bans also held that the size of a
political contribution does not determine or reflect its potential to cause
corruption.6o For example, a ban on large political contributions could be
easily circumvented by a large number of smaller contributions.6' Also,
these courts refuted the necessity of an obvious or specified relationship
between the politician who receives the contribution and the gaming
industry providing it because public officers often "wield power or
influence beyond that which is inherent in [their] official duties."6
Blanket ban proponents argue that the "evils traditionally
associated with casino gambling" are too difficult to prevent with narrow
legislation.63 Jurisdictions adopting this view perceive concentration of
wealth in the gaming industry as an inevitable precursor to political
corruption." However, this assertion sometimes lacks the evidence needed
to support it.
54 DePaul, 969 A.2d at 549.
ss Id. (stating that the New Jersey ban would not apply to an individual who merely owns an
interest in a business concern that owns an interest in the ownership of a gaming facility).
56 Id. at 549.
" Id. at 549.
5 Id. at 550 (quoting Solo, 565 A.2d at 1100).
9 DePaul, 969 A.2d at 550.
6o DePaul, 969 A.2d at 545 (citing Schiller Park Colonial Inn, Inc. v. Berz, 349 N.E.2d 61,
66 (Ill. 1976)) (noting that in Berz, 349 N.E.2d at 66, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected an
overbreadth argument similar to the one the Petition level in DePaul).
61 Id. (noting that the Berz Court rejected the effectiveness of corruption prevention laws that
prohibited contributions above a certain dollar amount).
62 Id. (citing Berz, 349 N.E.2d 61, 67 (ill. 1976).
63 DePaul, 969 A.2d at 551 (quoting Solo, 565 A.2d at 1093-1094).
6 See DePaul, 969 A.2d at 551.
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V. HOLDING
Ultimately, the DePaul court held that the appropriate test for
determining the constitutionality of blanket political bans is to assess the
relationship between the statute's legislative intent and the regulation used
to achieve it.65 Section 1102 of the Gaming Act recognizes that the Act's
primary objective of "protect[ing] the public."6 One other objective listed
in Section 1102, in direct reference to the Section 1513 political ban, stated
that a political ban is necessary to prevent "the actual or appearance of
corruption that may result from large campaign contributions...." 7
The DePaul court found that the legislative intent articulated a
fairly narrow governmental interest and that banning all political
68contributions was not a narrowly drawn means of furthering that interest.
Consequently, the court held that the Section 1513 political ban violated
Article I, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and enjoined its
enforcement. 6 9 The Pennsylvania legislature has not enacted any law nor
otherwise amended the Section 1513 political ban to address the articulated
concerns at the date of this Comment's publication.70
VI. IMPLICATIONS AND CONSEQUENCES
The recent economic recession caused a dramatic decrease in
betting and earnings at equine industry racetracks.n In hopes of raising
revenues, many racetracks have considered adding on-site gambling, most
commonly in the form of slot machines.72 States such as Pennsylvania have
seen increases in new tax revenue, the creation of thousands of jobs, and
reinvigoration of its horse industry, making on-site gambling an attractive
" See DePaul, 969 A.2d at 552.
" 4 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1102 (1) (2004) (amended 2010).
67 4 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1102 (11) (2004) (amended 2010).6 DePaUl, 969 A.2d at 552-53.
69 Id. at 554. Despite the court's ruling, in the 194 regular Session of the General
Assembly, the Pennsylvania Legislature voted to leave Section 1513 intact, making only minor
grammatical and structural changes. To address the court's rejection of the political ban in DePaul, the
legislature instead added two new provisions to Section 1102, "Legislative intent." New Section 10.1
states: "The General Assembly has a compelling interest in protecting the integrity of both the electoral
process and the legislative process by preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption which
may arise through permitting any type of political contributions by certain persons involved in the
gaming industry and regulated under this part." New Section 10.2 states: "Banning all types of political
campaign contributions by certain persons subject to this part is necessary to prevent corruption and the
appearance of corruption that may arise when political campaign contributions and gambling regulated
under this part are intermingled." 4 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1102 (10.1),(10.2) (2010).
7o See Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board, http://www.pgcb.state.pa.us (follow "Licensure"
hyperlink; then follow "Political Influence Statement" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 5, 2010).
71 Janet Patton, Drop in wagering eats into Ky. Coffers, LEXINGTON HERALD LEADER, Sep.
22, 2009, available at http://www.kentucky.com/2009/09/22/944935/ohio-high-court-ruling-puts-
racetrack.html.
72 id.
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option for the racing and gaming industry and the states in which they are
located. This trend is particularly relevant for Kentucky, home to multiple
racetracks, including Churchill Downs, the site of the world's most
renowned thoroughbred horse race, the Kentucky Derby. In Kentucky, the
addition of slot machines would transform the state's pre-existing
racetracks into "racinos." A proposal to allow slot machines in Kentucky's
racetracks has in recent years been both contemplated and rejected by the
Kentucky General Assembly and has been the topic of heated debate in
neighboring Ohio.74
While on-site gambling promises to benefit Kentucky and other
horse-racing states, the decision in DePaul reveals that it also has the
potential for negative consequences. States that do not already allow slot
machine gambling would need to enact statutes that include strict regulatory
provisions and establish some form of a gaming control board. DePaul's
exploration of the Pennsylvania Gaming Act reveals that regulations are
necessary to ensure governmental credibility and prevention of corruption
within industries of considerable wealth. This is particularly true in regards
to states such as Kentucky, where the horse racing industry is incredibly
influential and important to the local economy.
Furthermore, DePaul exposes the possibility that such regulatory
gaming laws can jeopardize constitutional rights. Although the DePaul
court declared the blanket ban unconstitutional, the court's analysis
included a survey of many jurisdictions that have upheld and continue to
impose political bans on certain categories of individuals. This is a serious
issue for states such as Kentucky and Ohio to consider when weighing the
costs and benefits of adding slot machine gambling to their racetracks.
Specifically, legislatures should consider whether the new revenue would
justify potentially sacrificing an individual's First Amendment rights.
It must also be noted that the DePaul court ordered strict scrutiny
review of political bans under racing and gaming statutes. Because such a
heightened level of will likely be imposed in other jurisdictions as well,
states implementing political bans must be prepared to demonstrate both a
sufficiently compelling interest and a closely tailored means of protecting
that interest. Specifically, state legislatures should ensure that their bans do
not cause any "unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms."
When reviewing these bans, courts should consistently apply the strictest
7 Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board, http://www.pgcb.state.pa.us (follow "Gaming"
hyperlink; then follow "Benefits for Pennsylvanians" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 18, 2009).
74 Julie Carr Smyth, Ohio High Court Ruling Puts Racetrack Slots on Hold, LEXINGTON
HERALD LEADER, Sept. 22, 2009, available at http://www.kentucky.com/2009/09/22/944935/ohio-high-
court-ruling-puts-racetrack.html.
" DePaul, 969 A.2d at 549 (citing Casino Ass'n of La v. La. ex rel. Foster, 820 So.2d 494,
509 (La. 2002)).
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standard of review to ensure great stability and confidence in the protection
of First Amendment rights.
VI. CONCLUSION
The DePaul court struck down the Pennsylvania Gaming Act's
Section 1513 political ban even though it served two legitimate public
purposes: protecting public confidence and preventing government
corruption. Most similar blanket bans have met the same fate in other
courtrooms nationwide. While state governments have an understandably
strong interest in the regulation and integrity of the racing and gaming
industry, DePaul shows that such an interest, unless it can satisfy the strict
scrutiny standard of review, will not outweigh an individual's First
Amendment rights to freedom of speech and expression. States have
extreme difficulty proving their political bans to be constitutional, as
evidenced by the fact that only two United States jurisdictions have upheld
complete blanket bans.
State governments must be applauded for any steps made towards
regulating and controlling the racing and gaming industry. Those efforts
surely bolster public confidence in the honesty and integrity of the state's
governmental functions. Such attempts must, however, be coupled with an
acute awareness of personal rights, for before the state is a protector of its
economy and government, it is a protector of its people and their
constitutional rights.
7
6 DePaul, 969 A.2d at 549.
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